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Introduction of an Income Contingent Repayment 
Scheme for Non-Performing Mortgage Loans 
Lessons from Hungary’s Case 
 
Edina Berlinger - György Walter 
 
Abstract 
In Hungary, more than 22% of the FX mortgage portfolio is non-performing and the 
tendency is worsening. In this paper we propose a solution to effectively reduce the credit and 
systemic risk inherent to this portfolio, but the proposed model can be applied to other 
mortgage portfolios in trouble, as well. The main element of our proposal is the income 
contingent repayment complemented with effective incentives to motivate debtors to repay 
their debt in a highly flexible way. We show that the proposed scheme is attractive both for 
the debtors and the lenders; therefore, contrary to some recent policy measures, in this case 
there is no need for direct state intervention to force modifications to the existing legal 
contracts. In order to evaluate the possible effects, we simulated a realistic population of 
borrowers with different age, debt, LTV and income. Then we calculated the expected income 
paths and the repayments of the borrowers, and also the profit of the lenders on the basis of 
the non-performing FX mortgage portfolio. The results underpin that the proposed scheme 
creates significant value added, and most importantly it can effectively reduce the 
vulnerability of the whole economy to future shocks.  
 
 
Keywords: FX mortgage loans, emerging markets, management of credit and systemic 
risk, PTI, income contingent repayment, micro-simulation 
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A jövedelemfüggő törlesztés bevezetése a nemfizető 
jelzáloghitelekre – a magyar eset tanulságai 
 
Berlinger Edina - Walter György 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Magyarországon a devizában denominált jelzáloghitel-portfólió nemfizetési aránya 22%-os, 
ami folyamatosan romló tendenciát mutat. Ebben a tanulmányban egy megoldási lehetőséget 
mutatunk be, amelynek segítségével hatásosan csökkenteni lehetne az ebből adódó hitelezési 
és rendszerkockázatot, de a megoldás kiterjeszthető bármilyen egyéb nemfizető 
jelzáloghitelekre is. Javaslatunk fő eleme a jövedelemfüggő törlesztés bevezetése, kiegészítve 
néhány fontos ösztönzővel, melyeknek segítségével a hitelfelvevők rendkívül rugalmasan, de 
vissza tudnák fizetni tartozásukat. Megmutatjuk azt is, hogy a konstrukció előnyös mind a 
hitelfelvevő, mind a bank számára, ezért – ellentétben néhány kormányzati intézkedéssel – ez 
a megoldás nem igényelné a szerződések állam által kikényszerített utólagos módosítását. 
Mikroszimulációs modellt építettünk annak érdekében, hogy felmérjük a javaslat hatását. 
Ebben az adósok életkora, eladósodottsága, jövedelme és hitel-/fedezetmutatója eltérő. 
Ezután kiszámítottuk a várható jövedelmi és törlesztési pályákat, illetve a hitelező nyereségét 
kifejezetten a nemfizető devizahitel-portfólióra nézve. Az eredmények alátámasztják, hogy a 
javasolt modell jelentős értéket teremtene és emellett csökkentené a gazdaság egészének 
sérülékenységét is. 
 
Tárgyszavak: devizahitelek, jelzálog, feltörekvő piacok, hitel és nemfizetési kockázat 
kezelése, törlesztés-/jövedelemarány, jövedelemfüggő törlesztés, mikroszimuláció 
 
JEL kód: E42, G17, G21, G28 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Credit dollarization is a phenomenon when market participants borrow in foreign currency, 
get access to the broader capital market and take significant exchange rate risk at the same 
time. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) called it as “original sin”, and they also warned that 
“dollarization eliminates all scopes for an independent national monetary policy”1. 
Interestingly, they also admitted that dollarization may have positive effects as well, because 
by providing extra financing in illiquid periods it can attenuate business cycles and can even 
contribute to the stability of financial systems on emerging markets. However, the authors 
argue that dollarization can be beneficial only if capital standards, prudential supervision and 
regulation are strengthened. However, it seems that these prerequisites typically do not hold 
for the most dollarized countries. Yeyati (2006) carried out a worldwide empirical analysis 
and demonstrated that financially dollarized economies suffer from lower and more volatile 
growth and a greater propensity to banking crises. On this ground, he advocates for an active 
de-dollarization policy. 
Originally, the term of dollarization refers to Latin American countries where almost all 
loans were denominated in U.S. dollars. However, in the first decade of this century Eastern 
European households and non-financial firms has also been massively borrowing in foreign 
currency, mainly in euro and Swiss franc. Several authors analyzed the driving factors and 
also the consequences of this process (e.g. Rosenberg, Tirpák 2008; Csajbók et al. 2010, Beer 
et al. (2010), Hudecz (2013)). European emerging countries show heterogeneity in terms of 
their credit-to-GDP ratios in foreign currencies. Latvia and Estonia have relatively high ratio; 
in other countries, like Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, foreign currency credits 
are significant but less dominant; while borrowers in Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic 
preferred to borrow in domestic currency, see Figure 1. 
Due to the global financial crisis, employment, wages, real estate prices, foreign exchange 
and interest rates changed adversely; hence the ratio of non-performing loans increased 
sharply, which contributed to the further deepening of the crisis. In the most concerned 
countries where currency loans were the most escalated and other macro conditions were 
also unfavorable monetary policy became extremely difficult as any further devaluation of the 
home currency may generate an economic and social catastrophe. The systemic risk due to 
FX loans has become one of the most severe problems in these countries, as it is the case in 
Hungary too. In this paper we focus solely on Hungary but concepts and also the proposed 
strategy can be applied to the other countries in similar situation. 
 
                                                        
1 See pp. 33 
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Figure 1 
Private sector credit-to-GDP ratios in some EU New Member States, in 2007 
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Source: webpages of Central Banks 
 
1.1. FOREIGN CURRENCY MORTGAGES IN HUNGARY 
At the end of 2013 the total outstanding debt to the household sector amounted to USD 31 
billion, out of which the mortgage portfolio was around USD 25 billion. The major part of 
mortgages, about USD 15.4 billion, was denominated in foreign currency (CHF, EUR or to 
some extent JPY), which accounted for approximately 13% of the GDP. More than 22% of 
currency based mortgage loans, USD 3.4 billion (2,8% of the GDP), can be regarded as non-
performing (more than 30 days of delay).  
The size of the average FX mortgage loan is around USD 28 000 and its average maturity 
is 14-15 years. In line with the heavy appreciation of the Swiss franc and the increase in 
interest margins, households faced growing debts in HUF which together with the drop in 
incomes and employment boosted the payment-to-income (PTI) ratios together with the non-
performing-loan (NPL) ratios, see Figure 2.  
We can observe on Figure 2 that in the recent years almost all loan portfolios have been 
continuously worsening, but the worst tendency and the highest NPL ratio belong to the FX 
mortgage portfolio.2  
 
                                                        
2 See MNB, National Bank of Hungary, Report on Financial Stability 2013 and Financial Stability 
Report 2014. 
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Figure 2 
Ratio of non-performing household loans by products in the banking system 
 
Source: MNB, National Bank of Hungary, Financial Stability Report 2014, chart 58 
 
1.2. MEASURES TO SOLVE THE FX MORTGAGE PROBLEM  
Banks and debtors have been making lots of efforts to manage FX mortgages by voluntary 
renegotiations and restructuration of the loan agreements, but these private initiations did 
not prove effective. Government and other supervisory institutions (Central Bank, Financial 
Services Authority, Banking Association) have also intervened in several forms to resolve the 
escalating conflicts. Some of the supervisory measures aimed at restricting and discouraging 
FX lending (temporary restriction of all FX lending, upper limit on the loan-to-value ratios 
for retail mortgage loans, ban on purely collateral based lending, redefinition of applicable 
conversion rates and other consumer protection type of provisions). Other provisions 
targeted a more prudential operation of the banks (capital adequacy and liquidity 
requirements). However, most of the legislative efforts have been initiated in order to assist 
FX debtors with the catchword of “protecting homes”3. In 2011In the framework of an early 
repayment program debtors could repay their loans at a fixed and highly preferential FX 
rate.  
- Since 2012 a freshly implemented new government agency (NAMA, National Asset 
Management Agency) has purchased mortgaged residential properties of the most 
                                                        
3 https://felugyelet.mnb.hu/data/cms2408096/ESRB_guidelines_compliance.pdf 
 8 
 
deprived debtors from the banks at a discounted price. Debts were cancelled and 
people could stay in their apartment while paying a favorable rental fee.  
- A government-backed exchange rate fixing scheme was set up (in 2011-2012) and 
borrowers could join it voluntary in order to defer the repayment burden of the 
remaining FX loans. The difference between the fixed, preferential FX rate and the 
actual market rate is collected on a special account as a HUF loan. The capital part of 
this deferred HUF loan is required to be paid back by the debtor after a grace period 
of 60 months, while the interest part is financed 50-50% by the lender bank and the 
central budget. 
- Recently, (in 2015 autumn) a new FX loan relief package was accepted by the 
parliament which relies on the latest Hungarian supreme court’s ruling. According to 
this, bid-ask margins applied by the banks during currency conversions were unfair 
and now have to be recalculated on the basis of the National Bank mid-prices and the 
difference should be reimbursed to the borrowers. Similarly, unilateral and 
unjustifiable increases in the interest rates are also to be refunded. 
- The latest development is that in 2015-16 simultaneously with the settlement of loan 
charges deemed unfair, FX mortgage loans will have to be converted to HUF in a 
lump sum at the market rate (so called mandatory HUF conversion).  
Table 1 summarizes the most important programs and their estimated costs to the banks 
and the state. In order to compare different country’s policy mix to this problem, see 
Bethlendi (2001). 
As we can see in Table 1, both banks and the government contributed to help the FX 
debtors, but the costs of these programs were mostly financed by the banking sector. It is 
especially true if we also take the bank levy into consideration, which is among the highest 
ones in Europe.4 It is also remarkable, that until now far the most expensive program was the 
early repayment scheme of 2011 which cost much more than all together the operation of the 
National Asset Management Agency, the Exchange Rate Fixing Scheme and the New Home 
Creation Program. Moreover, banks were obliged to accept early repayments at a highly 
preferential FX rate, hence the state intervened into contracts between private parties, which 
compromises the rule of law and the legal certainty. Moreover, it is also clear that the 
beneficiaries of this program were the most better-offs who could afford to repay their debt in 
a lump sum. It is also worth noticing, that the freshly announced new relief package is 
expected to cost three times more to the banks than the extensively criticized early repayment 
program. The forthcoming HUF conversion is to be managed by the National Bank of 
Hungary which provides the necessary FX liquidity using its reserves. Thus, this measure has 
                                                        
4 Bank levy was introduced in 2010. It is based on the size of the balance sheet and not on the profit. 
Since 2010 several banks in Hungary are in massive loss. 
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practically no direct costs, but being mandatory it is again a posterior change of private 
contracts forced by the state. 
Table 1 
Most important programs targeting FX mortgages 
Program Timing Affected 
exposure* 
(bn USD) 
Costs to the 
banks  
(bn USD) 
Costs to the 
state 
(bn USD) 
Total 
costs  
(bn USD) 
Early 
Repayment 
Program1 
from 
Sept 2011 
to Dec 
2011 
4.5 
 
 
1.1 
(value 
difference) 
0.5 
(tax reduction) 
 
1.6 
National 
Asset 
Management 
Agency2  
from Jan 
2012 
0.15 0.08 
(value 
difference) 
0.07 
(invested 
capital) 
0,006 
(operational 
costs  
per year) 
 
0.16 
Exchange 
Rate Fixing 
Scheme3 
 
from May 
2012 
6.5 
 
0.09 
(interest rate 
subsidy) 
0.09 
(interest rate 
subsidy) 
0.18 
 
 
New Home 
Creation 
Program4 
from 
2012 
- - 0.55 
 per year  
(interest rate 
subsidy) 
0.55  
per year 
New FX 
Relief 
Package5 
  
2015 15.4 0.9 
(margin) 
3 
(interest rate) 
- 3.9 
Mandatory 
HUF 
Conversion 
2015-16 15.4 - - - 
* The size of the total foreign currency mortgage portfolio was around 15.4 bn USD at the 
end of 2013. USD/HUF=230 
1 PSZÁF: Gyorselemzés a végtörlesztésről. 2012. március 12., 2. o. 
2 http://www.netzrt.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/20140103_K%C3%B6zlem%C3%A9ny_T%C3%B6bb-ezer-
elad%C3%B3sodott-csal%C3%A1don-seg%C3%ADtett-a-NET-program.pdf 
http://www.netzrt.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NET-
Zrt_2013_m%C3%A9rleg_eredm%C3%A9ny.pdf 
3 http://felugyelet.mnb.hu/bal_menu/jelentesek_statisztikak/statisztikak/arfolyamgat 
4 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/12002/adatok/fejezetek/42.pdf  
5http://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/penzugy/mnb_ennyit_bukhatnak_a_bankok_csa
k_az_arfolyamres_miatt.202134.html 
 Source: compiled by the authors 
 
One of the most important conclusions we can draw by assessing all these measures is 
that regardless of the enormous burden levied on the banking sector and the drastic state 
interventions into legal contracts (early repayment at preferential rate and mandatory HUF 
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conversion) the total household leverage remains significant, therefore low-income people 
may have difficulties to repay their debts even in HUF, hence systemic risk remains an 
important issue.  
2. THE PROPOSED STRATEGY5 
When formulating our proposal to manage non-performing mortgage loans denominated in 
home or foreign currency we followed some basic principles: 
- The policy goal is to reduce overall systemic risk: The main objective is not to 
redistribute realized profits and losses in the name of social justice (this is rather a 
political question), but to reduce the country’s exposure to future shocks in order to 
diminish macro-level financial vulnerability.  
- There is a need for state intervention: Systemic risk can be viewed as a negative 
externality. Contracting parties (lender and borrower) benefited from the transaction 
while they contribute to the instability of the financial system. As a consequence, the 
cost of the increased systemic risk is paid by other, non-contracting players (e.g. 
taxpayers). Due to the large number of stakeholders and the high transaction costs it 
cannot be expected that the problem of negative externalities will be solved privately. 
Thus, in defense of the community’s interests, state intervention is justified. 
- Legal contracts should be respected: Debtors must be regarded as responsible actors, 
therefore they have to repay their debt and have to bear the all corresponding risks 
provided that they were properly informed before signing the contract. On the other 
hand, any compulsory retroactive modification of existing contracts between lenders 
and borrowers should be avoided as it is contrary to the rule of law. A new scheme can 
be applied if and only if contracting parties agree on that. 
Ability-to-pay depends most of all on the repayment burden, which can be measured as 
the ratio of the repayment to the net income (PTI, payment-to-income ratio), see Banai et al 
(2014). In case of FX mortgages PTI depends on three risk factors: 1) the net income, 2) the 
exchange rate and 3) the interest rate of the loan. The basic idea of our proposal is to reduce 
the sensitivity of the non-performing portfolio to all of these factors:  
- income risk to be hedged via income contingent (IC) repayment; 
- foreign exchange risk to be dissolved by forint conversion of the non-performing 
loans; 
- interest rate risk to be diminished by fixing the margins at lower levels. 
                                                        
5 A more detailed discussion of the proposal can be found in Berlinger, Walter (2013) and Berlinger, 
Walter (2014) in Hungarian. 
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The detailed discussion of the effects of forint conversion and the interest rate 
mechanism can be found in Berlinger-Walter (2013) and Berlinger-Walter (2014). 
Contrary to fix repayments, income contingent repayments are automatically and 
continuously adjusted to the actual income of the borrower over the whole maturity of the 
loan. In these systems repayment is a monotone increasing function of the income. In a pure 
income contingent scheme repayments are calculated as a fix percentage of the actual 
incomes. The maturity of the loan is not predetermined; it depends on the income path of the 
given borrower and the interest rate over the time. The more someone earns, the quicker she 
is able to repay her debt. Other distinctive feature of income contingent loans is the (more or 
less) direct involvement of the tax authority in the collection mechanism. For the extensive 
discussion of the role of income contingent schemes in student lending see Barr (2012). A 
less flexible type of income contingent repayment mechanism was proposed by Modigliani 
(1976) specifically in relation with the mortgages. 
Until recently, income contingent loans were applied only in state managed student loan 
schemes, at least at mass level. However, Stiglitz et al. (2014) proposes to expand its scope to 
other retail lending situations for example in case of unemployment, maternity leave and 
research sabbatical or any kinds of temporary financing problems. Stiglitz (2013) proves 
within the framework of an optimization model that income contingent loans (IC loans) are 
an effective tool of income smoothing over the lifetime; and its application increases the 
welfare, especially in case of high uncertainty, asymmetric information or other market 
failures.  
In relation with the repayment cash-flows, IC schemes have two important 
characteristics, such as: 
(i) Patience: the maturity and more importantly the average duration of the loan 
repayments increase significantly.  
(ii) Flexibility: as the repayment automatically adjusts to the income, temporary low 
income does not lead to default. On the other hand, high income periods speed up 
the repayment; hence effectively reduce the lender’s exposure. 
Income contingent loans are similar to equity financing, when the provider of the 
financing receives a part of the profit (here future incomes). In this setting, outside financing 
does not increase the leverage of the borrower; hence default risk is practically eliminated. 
However, income contingent repayments are not a panacea to all kinds of financing 
problems. When we switch from fix to IC, we minimize default risk but at the same time we 
increase the cash-flow risk of the lender and we increase the moral hazard, because 
borrowers will be tempted to do less efforts or to hide their incomes, see Tirole (2006). It is 
extensively proved theoretically in the field of corporate finance that debt-like financing 
(fixed repayment) is the optimal choice from incentive perspective, because it motivates the 
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lender (the agent) to do her best in order to maximize the value of the underlying investment. 
This is a robust result, as it is true 1) for limited liabilities and risk neutral borrowers, Innes 
(1990); 2) for unlimited liabilities and risk averse borrowers, Hermalin and Katz (1991) and 
also 3) for limited liabilities and risk averse borrowers, Dewatriport (2003). Intuitively, the 
incentive-optimality of the fixed repayment scheme is due to the fact that all the excess 
return over the fix repayment will remain in the borrower’s pocket; that is why she becomes 
highly motivated to succeed. It is also important to emphasize that when running an IC 
scheme, the efficiency of the tax mechanism (administration costs, enforcement power etc.) is 
also a key factor. 
Based on the above considerations, we can conclude that an IC scheme can be favorable 
to a fix one if: 
- default risk is a more important concern than moral hazard (e.g. in crisis time, or in 
case of long term and unsecured loans like student loans, or when moral hazard can 
be effectively eliminated in other ways); 
- cash-flow risk can be reduced or managed (e.g. it is diversifiable within a big portfolio 
or the lender has easy access to liquid capital markets); 
- the tax system is well developed or there is a strong commitment to improve it; 
In our opinion, in relation with the non-performing mortgage loans in Hungary default 
risk is definitely dominating moral hazard.The size of the loan portfolio is so significant that 
in case of some external (or internal) shocks individual defaults can easily reach a critical 
level which is not manageable anymore, which can lead to a widespread economic and social 
breakdown. Moreover, if lots of mortgages were executed at the same time, the real estate 
prices would drop significantly, hence collateral values would melt down. In this situation, 
especially when there is a massive oversupply on the labor market, fears that people were 
reluctant to work harder seem less relevant. Similarly, cash-flow risk is much easier to 
manage than default risk and systemic risk. And finally, the Hungarian tax system is 
developed enough to support the Hungarian income contingent student loan scheme since 
2001, therefore the institutional capacity is also available6. 
Notwithstanding, even if these requirements hold, when designing an IC scheme, 
incentives to repay must be in the focus. In our proposal the elements of the incentive system 
are the followings:  
- Mortgages are maintained until full repayment: borrowers can live in their own 
home while they are fulfilling their obligations on time according to the IC repayment 
scheme. If a borrower were in a delay of more than 90 days, her propriety would be 
                                                        
6 The administration costs per year are under 1% of the portfolio value, see 
http://www.diakhitel.hu/index.php/en. 
 13 
 
sold out and she would lose it irrevocably. At the same time borrowers will have the 
opportunity to keep their housing even if they earn a little for a long time.  
- Repayments have a lower limit: borrowers are required to repay at least a given 
percentage (repayment rate) of the actual minimal wage. Experience with the 
Hungarian student loan system also underpins that minimal repayment requirements 
help to keep contact with the borrowers and make them more disciplined. 
- Disciplined debtors have lower interest rate: borrowers repaying regularly benefit 
from lower interest rate in line with their lower risk (system of risk adjusted interest 
rate margins). This is an important tool to attract borrowers to enter the new, income 
contingent scheme and to keep them disciplined at the same time. 
- Borrowers possess an attractive early repay option: in case borrowers have some out 
of ordinary funding (legacy, prize, project etc.) they can choose to repay her debt even 
in a lump sum at face value without any extra fee. In this way they can get rid of the 
accumulating interest rates. In the Hungarian student loan scheme the early 
repayments are higher than regular repayments7, therefore this provision is 
remarkably effective in motivating quick repayment.   
We can summarize that incentive problems in an IC scheme can be effectively tackled in 
case of mortgage loans, not least because mortgages create strong incentives to repay by their 
nature. In the following part we show that the proposed strategy creates significant value 
added both for the borrowers and the lenders.  
3. MODELLING AND SIMULATIONS 
In this analysis we only focus on the non-performing loans, i.e. those debtors who are 
currently not able to pay back their obligations. In accordance with our proposal, these loans 
are converted into forint, and are repaid in an income contingent way.  
With the help of a micro-simulation model we compared the operation of the income 
contingent scheme to the fixed one by assuming that non-performing loans are terminated, 
collaterals are sold and credit losses are written off as it follows from the usual banking 
practice.  
3.1. GENERAL TERMS, NOTATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
The micro-simulation model was calibrated to the real world data but in order to focus on the 
main relationships we made some simplifications. For example cash flows are modelled on 
                                                        
7 http://www.diakhitel.hu/index.php/en 
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an annual basis and growth factors (income growth rate, interest rate of the loan, inflation, 
refinancing cost, risk margins, etc.) are supposed to be constant.  
In the new income contingent scheme the repayments are due both in the active and the 
retirement periods. The net nominal income (J) of a given debtor increases from now (t=0) 
until retirement (t=N) according to the growth rate, which is composed of the real income 
growth rate (w), and the inflation (i). At retirement a reduction in incomes is supposed in 
line with the replacement rate (h – first pension income / last net wage income). Then the 
pension grows by the same rate as the wage income before, until the death of the borrower 
(t=L). 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
Loan repayment ( ) is purely income contingent, hence it equals α percentage of the 
actual income (net income or pension), until the debt ( ) is paid back or until the death of 
the borrower at the latest.  
 
   (2) 
 
 
 
 
The debt of a borrower in the end of year t ( ) is increased by the accumulating interest 
rate (y) and is decreased by the repayments ( ), but it cannot become negative:  
 
 
(3) 
 
The interest rate of the loan (y) is the sum of the base rate (BUBOR) and a fixed risk 
margin (c). 
 
 
(4) 
 
The year when the total debt becomes 0 (full repayment is reached) is denoted as t*. But 
the maturity of the loan (M) cannot be longer than the lifetime of the debtor (L). 
 
 
(5) 
 
We also supposed that the nominal value of the collateral (Ft) is increasing by the 
inflation (i) and is decreasing by the depreciation rate (a). 
 
 
(6) 
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In case of the borrower’s decease (t=L), the collateral is executed, i.e. the real estate is 
sold, and the outstanding debt is reduced by the sale revenue. When calculating the sale 
revenue we supposed that the bank cannot sell the collateral at its nominal value but at a 
reduced price decreased by a d liquidation discount. If the balance (=revenue-debt) is 
positive, it is inheritable otherwise the remaining debt is written off and the deficit is 
considered as the loss of the bank.  
As we can see, banks have two types of incomes: repayments from the debtors and 
eventually the sale of the collaterals. If all of these incomes are calculated in present values 
and are compared to the currently outstanding loan we receive the so called profit (also in 
present value) (Π).  
 
 
 
 
(7) 
 
We have to notice, that in the practice this excess income over the refinancing costs is not 
a pure profit, as this must cover all the administrative expenses and also the credit risk.  
Cash flows are discounted at the banks’ refinancing cost (f), which is the sum of the base 
rate (BUBOR) and a fixed margin reflecting the credit risk of the bank (b). In case the 
government provides a preferential refinancing at rate (p) to support the program, the 
refinancing cost can be even lower. 
 
 
 
(8) 
However, if the bank refused to participate in the income contingent scheme and sticks to 
the original, fixed repayment schedule, then non-performing loans would be managed in the 
usual way: positions are closed, collaterals are sold out and the remaining debts are written 
off.  In this case the profit ( ) is defined in the following way:  
 
(9) 
 
The difference between the two values (Π-Π’) is due to the extra effort the bank takes in 
order to get repaid by entering into the income contingent scheme instead of closing its 
positions right now. This is why we call this difference as the value added of the income 
contingent scheme (VA). 
 
 
(10) 
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Having simulated the cash flows of the bank, the ex post return can also be determined by 
calculating the rate at which the present value of future cash flows is just equal to the current 
value of the outstanding loan (IRR, internal rate of return). If all debtors were able to fully 
repay their debts, collaterals would not be executed at all and ex-post return would equal the 
interest rate of the loan (y). Otherwise, the internal rate of return is less than the interest rate 
of the loan.  
3.2. INDIVIDUAL SCENARIOS 
The input parameters of the model can be grouped into three categories: 
 Debtors’ attributes: age, debt, LTV and income  
 External macro-economic conditions: depreciation of the collateral (real estate), 
inflation, liquidation discount of the collateral, BUBOR, growth rate of incomes, 
retirement age, replacement ratio of pensions and refinancing cost of the bank 
 Decision / control variables: repayment rate and risk margin for the non-performing 
loans 
Parameters of the first two categories are exogenous, hence cannot be influenced by the 
stakeholders (debtors, banks, state) while decision variables can be discussed during the 
design and implementation of the system and the final calibration should be the result of a 
consensus adopted by all the parties. Table 2 presents the parameter values we applied along 
the calculations. We also indicated how the given representative value was determined. The 
actual USD/HUF rate is 246.  
Depending on the income of the borrowers and the number of co-borrowers within the 
contract we defined four different scenarios:  
A: One borrower earning a minimum wage  
B: Two borrowers earning minimum wages 
C: One borrower earning an average income 
D: Two borrowers earning average incomes 
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Table 2 
Parameter values 
 Parameter value Remark 
DEBTORS’ ATTRIBUTES   
Expected lifetime of debtors (L) 30 years average8 
Debt outstanding (H0) USD 33 000 pessimistic 
estimation9 
Loan to value ratio (LTV= H0/F0) 100% pessimistic estimation 
Monthly net average income (J0) USD 623  average10 
Monthly net minimum wage (J0) USD 270 actual regulation11 
EXTERNAL CONDITIONS   
Depreciation of real estates (a) 2% accounting standard 
Inflation (i) 3% realistic estimation 
Liquidation discount of the collateral (d) 0,4 realistic estimation 
BUBOR (12 months) 3.5% actual value 
Annual growth rate of incomes (w) 3.5% realistic estimation 
Retirement age  age of 65  actual regulation 
Replacement ratio of pension (h) 0.8 realistic estimation 
CONTROL VARIABLES   
Repayment rate relative to the net income  30% assumption 
Risk margin of non-performing loans (c) 4% assumption 
Refinancing cost of the bank (f) BUBOR+0.5% assumption 
Source: the authors 
 
When examining the effects of introducing an income contingent repayment scheme 
output variables for each scenario were calculated. 
Output variables from the borrowers’ perspective: 
- monthly net (disposable) income (J0) 
- PTI ratio (relative to the net income) in the fixed scheme (PTIfixed) 
- PTI ratio (relative to the net income) in the income contingent scheme (PTIic) 
Output variables from the lender’s perspective: 
- maturity of the loans (M)  
- total amount of collaterals sold relative to total bank income (F0/(F0+T0))  
- profit of the lender under income contingent repayment (Π)  
- value added (Π-Π’)  
- ex post annual return (IRR). 
                                                        
8 The age of an average debtor is currently 44 years based on the portfolio of one of the major 
mortgage/retail banks. At this age the expected additional average lifetime for women is 34, for 
men is 26 years. Thus the average remaining lifetime of men and women is around 30 years. 
9 The average debt is around USD 28 000 (total portfolio/number of contracts=3,4 billion/120000). 
To be prudent, we calculated with a higher-than-average debt (around the 80% quantile). 
10 The average gross income in Hungary in 2014 January-September was HUF 234 000, hence the 
monthly net average income was HUF 153 270 (without family tax alleviations).  
11 The monthly net minimum wage in Hungary in 2014 is HUF 66 480 (without family tax 
alleviations). 
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Table 3 presents the output variables resulted from the model calculations based on the 
parameter values in Table 2. 
Table 3 
Output variables for different scenarios  
Scenarios A 
one min. 
wage 
B 
two min. 
wages 
C 
one avg. 
income 
D 
two avg. 
incomes 
BORROWER     
Monthly net income in USD 
(J0) 
270 541 623 1246 
PTI fixed 116% 58% 50% 25% 
PTI income contingent 30% 30% 30% 30% 
LENDER     
Loan maturity in years (M) - 30  22  9  
Collateral/ total income 
F/(F+T) 
23.79% 0% 0% 0% 
Profit in USD (Π)  978 17 820 13 657 5 554 
Value added in USD (Π- Π’) 14 178 31 020 26 857 18 754 
Ex post annual return (IRR) 4,17% 7,5% 7,5% 7,5% 
Source: the authors 
 
 
We can see from Table 3 that PTI ratios in the fixed scheme ranges widely between 116% 
(scenario A) and 25% (scenario D), hence it is not surprising that in the lower income 
categories NPL ratio are so high at the present time. The major advantage of the income 
contingent scheme is that PTI is automatically fixed and is constant across all income 
categories and over the whole maturity of the loan (20% to the gross income, thus 30% to the 
net income). In this way, by the introduction of the IC scheme, the repayment burden is 
significantly alleviated in scenarios A, B and C. This is partly due to the longer maturities, but 
more importantly to the expected income growth which enables future repayments to 
increase as well. 
Results show, that except for scenario A debtors are able to fully repay their obligations 
during their expected lifetime. Even in the most unfavorable case (scenario A) borrowers 
repay the capital and the refinancing costs, and it is only the risk margin (4%) which is not 
fully refunded. The repayment is financed partly from the sale of the collateral (at the end of 
the life of the borrower), which accounts only for the 23,79% of the total income of the bank. 
However, if the bank decided to promptly terminate the overdue contract and to sell the 
collateral immediately, then its revenue would be much less which is reflected in the highly 
positive value added of the income contingent scheme (VA= USD 18 thousand which is more 
than the half of the actual debt, H0= USD 33 thousand).  
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We can also observe that as the income of the debtor(s) grows the expected maturity of 
the income contingent loan decreases sharply. While in some cases the maturity can be very 
long (30 years or more) depending on the loan portfolio’s composition the average maturity 
under the IC scheme can be fairly close to the actual maturity of the fixed loans (15 years). 
Collaterals are executed only in scenario A; in the other cases debts are repaid solely from the 
future incomes. It is interesting to note, that the profit of the lender is not a monotone 
function of the income, because as income grows, the maturity of the loan decreases, hence 
the borrower pays less risk margin in total. Two borrowers on minimal wages (scenario B) are 
able to fully repay their debt, but only in 30 years, therefore they pay a lot of risk premium; 
and this is why they become the most profitable clients. Not surprisingly, the value added is 
closely related to the profit of the lender, thus it shows a similar pattern. The ex post return 
equals to the interest rate of the loan (7.5%) in scenarios B, C and D, where debtors fully 
repay. However, in scenario A the ex post return is somewhat lower, because the debtor will 
not be able to repay all its obligations and a part of it will be written off as the loss of the 
lender. 
Of course, in special cases the bank might get into worse scenarios than presented above, 
for example in case of higher LTV, early death of the debtor, lower incomes, or due to 
external parameters changing adversely relative to our assumptions. From this aspect, the 
most powerful macro-economic factors are the growth rate of real incomes and the real 
interest rates; more precisely, it is their long term relation which matters the most. In our 
model we prudently assumed a real income growth rate of 0.5% being lower than the real 
interest rate (4%-3%=1%). 
3.3. PORTFOLIO EFFECTS 
In order to analyze the portfolio level effects of the introduction of the income contingent 
scheme, we simulated the total non-performing mortgage portfolio presently denominated in 
foreign currency described in the reports of the National Bank of Hungary (MNB 2013) and 
(MNB 2014). This portfolio includes about 120 000 contract with a total volume of about 
USD 3.4 billion. The estimated inner structure of the portfolio is presented in Table 4. 
Unfortunately, in the other dimensions, detailed statistics were not available. Hence 
when building up the micro-simulation model, parameters were adjusted to the available 
aggregated statistics as closely as possible. If no data were available, then we made realistic 
assumptions.   
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Table 4 
The estimated structure of the non-performing FX mortgage portfolio  
(2013, in USD)12 
Debt Frequency Number of contracts Portolio size 
6 000 14% 16 800 100 800 000 
16 000 32% 38 400 614 400 000 
26 000 24% 28 800 748 800 000 
36 000 12% 14 400 518 400 000 
50 000 11% 13 200 660 000 000 
70 000 4% 4 800 336 000 000 
100 000 2% 2 400 240 000 000 
140 000 1% 1 200 168 000 000 
 
100% 120 000 3 386 400 000 
Source: 
http://www.mnb.hu/Root/Dokumentumtar/MNB/Kiadvanyok/mnbhu_stabil/mnbhu_sta
b_jel_201111/Szakertoi_prezentacio_HUN_Stabililitasijelentes_201111.pdf, pp. 15 
 
We created a population of borrowers by simulating their main attributes: age, debt, LTV 
and income; while external macro-economic conditions and control variables presented in 
Table 2 remained unchanged. We also assumed that the four attributes were independent 
from each other. Simulation was run in an Excel VBA program for 10 000 loan contracts, and 
this population was then multiplied by 12.  
Age: We assumed that the age of the debtors follows a normal distribution with a mean of 
44 years and a standard deviation of 6 years. We also introduced a lower bound for the age at 
25 years. For the sake of simplicity we assumed that debtors within the same contract were 
completely identical. We supposed that all borrowers work until the age of 65, and then live 9 
years as pensioner.13 Early death was not modelled, because this type of risk is hedged via life 
insurance contracts corresponding to the loan contract. 
Debt (H0): Debt size was estimated according to Table 4.  
Loan to value ratio (LTV): We assumed that the distribution of the LTV ratios is normal 
too with a mean of 1.2 and a standard deviation of 0.2. As LTV cannot be negative, we 
introduced a lower bound of 0.  
Monthly net incomes (J0): Although there are publicly available reports on the distribution 
of the incomes of the whole Hungarian population, these statistics cannot be used here 
because the income of this special group (non-performing borrowers) might be totally 
                                                        
12 We supposed that in the case of the non-performing loans the weights of the categories are the 
same as in the case of the whole FX mortgage portfolio.  
13 This is consistent with Table 2, remark 7. 
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different, certainly, lower income categories are over-represented. So, as no reliable statistics 
on the income of non-performing borrowers were found, we assumed that only four income 
scenarios (A-B-C-D) existed, exactly those ones we defined in the previous point. 
Frequencies were estimated according to some experts’ opinion, see Table 5.  
Table 5 
Estimated frequency of the income scenarios 
Scenarios A 
one min. 
wage 
B 
two min. 
wages 
C 
one avg. 
income 
D 
two avg. 
incomes 
Monthly net income in USD 
(J0) 
270 541 623 1246 
Frequency14 30% 40% 20% 10% 
Source: aggregating experts’ subjective opinion 
 
Income paths were simulated by supposing that the annual real wage growth rates were 
independent and normally distributed stochastic variables with a mean of 0.5% and a 
standard deviation of 0.2%.  
Having created an artificial but realistic population we calculated the performance 
measures from the lender’s point of view defined in Table 3. In this parameter-setting 67.43% 
of the borrowers were able to fully repay in their lifetime and there was no need for selling 
out the collateral. Moreover, those individuals who could not fully repay their obligations 
proved to be profitable for the bank in 87% of the cases, because collaterals were enough to 
compensate the capital and its accumulated financing cost and even a part of the risk 
premium. If we take a helicopter view of the whole portfolio, it turns out that that the 
aggregate profit (Π) is around USD 0.45 billion which is more than 13% of the portfolio’s 
actual face value. 
However, if, contrary to our proposal, the banking sector decides not to participate in this 
program, and defaulted debt contracts are terminated immediately by executing the 
mortgages at a liquidation discount of 40%, then according to our calculations about 48% of 
the portfolio face value would be immediately lost (USD 1.64 billion)15. Thus, if our 
assumptions hold, the value added resulting from the fix-to-IC switch is 0.45+(-1.64)=2.1 
billion in USD. It is important to emphasize that the introduction of the IC scheme does not 
increase the credit risk of the banks, as all the risks are already present in the system.  
Of course, this impressive performance is also due to the cheap state refinancing. It is 
worth calculating the costs of this support affecting the state budget. If the banks’ refinancing 
                                                        
14 Four practitioners were asked and their answers were averaged. 
15 The price impact of the increased selling activity was not taken into consideration. 
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costs are around BUBOR+2%=3.5%+2%=5.5%, then the state refinancing at 4% induces an 
annual public cost of 1.5% based on the portfolio’s face value. Therefore, in the first years the 
total public costs would be around USD 0.05 billion, but later on as debts are gradually paid 
back it will significantly decrease. However, these costs are not effective while banks are able 
to pay back the refinancing loans (no default event occurs) because the interest rate of the 
refinancing loans (4%) exceeds Treasury bond rates (3.5%). In our opinion some state 
support in form of cheap refinancing can be justified, especially if we also consider the 
spillover effects. 
Finally, in order to get insight into the inner structure of the portfolio performance it is 
worth examining the distribution of the output variables too, see Figure 3, 4 and 5. 
Figure 3 
Maturities and the weight of the collateral 
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Source: micro-simulation 
 
It can be seen on Figure 3 that loans are repaid within 35 years except for those that 
cannot be repaid at all. Moreover, 38% of the loans are repaid within 10 years; hence the 
average maturity of the repaid loans is fairly short being around 15 years, exactly like in the 
fixed scheme. In case the borrowers take advantage of their early repayment option, 
maturities can be even shorter.16 Another advantage of the IC scheme is that the sales of the 
collaterals are postponed and dispersed in time; therefore adverse price impacts on the real 
estate market are minimized. The weight of collateral revenues is remarkably low within the 
total income of the bank; cash-flows are dominated by the income contingent repayments.  
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the lender’s profit and the added value of the IC 
scheme relative to the fixed one. 
 
 
                                                        
16 We did not model early repayment behavior of the debtors. 
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Figure 4 
Profits and the value added of the IC scheme 
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Source: micro-simulation 
 
In more than 80% of the cases the lender’s profit on one contract is between 0 and 20 
thousands (the average face value is 28 thousands). The value added is calculated as the 
difference between profits in the IC and the fixed schemes. Given that profits in the fixed 
scheme are negative (due to the forced sale of the collaterals), value added of the IC scheme is 
even higher than the profit. Both part of Figure 4 and also Figure 5 underpin that banks can 
improve their positions significantly by entering the IC scheme. 
Figure 5 
Ex post annual returns 
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As we could also see in Table 3, when debtors fully repay on finite time horizon the ex 
post annual return of the lender equals the interest rate of the loan (7.5% in our model). Of 
course, there are some cases when the ex post annual return is negative, but this risk is 
practically negligible. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
We argued that if certain conditions hold IC repayments may be favorable to fixed ones not 
only in student lending but also in the case of non-performing mortgage loans. On this 
ground, we proposed to convert the Hungarian non-performing household mortgages 
denominated in foreign currencies into forints, to lower the interest rate margins and to 
introduce income contingent repayments for the remaining debts. This would be a voluntary 
scheme where contractors (banks and borrowers) can switch to only if both of them agree on.  
We have also shown in the framework of a micro-simulation model that with the help of an 
IC scheme the vast majority of non-performing loans can be repaid while borrowers are not 
overburdened. The proposed scheme is attractive for all the stake-holders. 
It is attractive for the borrowers, because PTI ratios in the lower income categories could 
drop to one third or even to one forth as Table 3 shows. Default risk is practically eliminated 
while low earning borrowers can keep their home over their lifetime, and it also remains 
inheritable to their children. 
It is attractive for the lenders, because low PTI ratios and strong incentives to repay 
(mortgage right, minimum repayment requirement, lower interest rates for good borrowers 
and early repayment option) lead to low NPL ratios, which creates high value added for the 
banks (2.1 billion of USD for a portfolio of 3.4 billion of USD). Cash-flow risk can be managed 
by portfolio diversification and/or by refinancing on the capital markets or by the state. The 
price impact on the FX market and on the real estate market is also minimized as HUF 
conversions and sales of the collaterals are postponed and dispersed over time. Finally, it is 
also clear that in this mass volume income contingent repayment is much cheaper than 
endless bilateral negotiations between bank and client. 
It is also attractive for the state, because systemic risk is effectively reduced at a fairly low 
public cost. State support to the scheme consists of the operation of the collection mechanism 
by developing the tax system, the cheap refinancing for the banks and assisting HUF 
conversions in order to attenute the price impact on the FX markets. In this way, state can 
exploit synergies between banking system, tax system, student lending etc., and can attenuate 
negative externalities without intervening into private contracts by force. The technical 
problems of practical implementation can also be resolved based on the international and 
Hungarian experience with student lending. 
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